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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FOREMEN - THE INDUSTRIAL QUESTION MARK
By
I. HERBERT ROTHENBERG*
One of the most difficult problems that has arisen under the National Labor
Relations Act appertains to the status and rights of supervisory employees. The
recent litigation in the so-called "Packard Foremen's Case"' has pointed up
rather than resolved the complexity of the problem.
The Packard Foremen's Case was by no means the first instance in which
the right of supervisory employees . . .viz: foreman ...

to collective bargaining

under the National Labor Relations Act was raised. On the contrary the issue
has a substantial and interesting history, to which we shall directly advert.
In considering the question of the status and rights of supervisory employees, it must first be remembered that the issue has three distinct facets: the
first is the question of whether supervisory employees have the basic right of
organization and collective bargaining; secondly, whether such employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit; and, finally, whether there exists in the
employer the duty to recognize and bargain collectively with a bargaining unit
of that character.
Before exploring any of the foregoing aspects of the question, it might be
well to first enquire into what constitutes one as a supervisory employee, as
contrasted to other categories of employee. Generally speaking, employees may
be classed in three groups: production, supervisory and executive. Treating
these groups in inverse order of their presentation, it may broadly be said that
executive employees are those who participate in the formulation or variation
of "policy. "2 The supervisory employee may be characterized as a functionary
to whom has been delegated the execution of "policy," but who has no substantial discretion therein. The production employee, of course, is the physical
worker who is completely removed from "policy."

*Professor, Dickinson School of Law; Author, LABOR UNIONS AND LABOR LAW, being
revised for publication; Member Philadelphia Bar; Specialist and consultant in labor matters; lecturer.
IN.L.R.B. vs. Packard Motor Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (204), enforced in 157 F. (2nd) 80,
affirmed in 67 S. Ct. 789.
2
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. vs. N.L.R.B., 119 F. (2nd) 903.
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The National Labor Relations Act3 defines an "Employee" as follows: 4
"The term 'employee' shall include any employee', and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of or
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practise, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall
not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer
or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home,
or any individual employed by his family or spouse."
It will be observed that the foregoing definition of "employee" includes any
employee. The only ones excluded from the definition are those expressly eliminated by the Act's own terms. The Act instead of actually defining what an
employee is merely says in effect: "An employee is an employee." The interpolation of the word "any" to expand the word "employee" does not supply the
deficiency. The term "employee" still remains undefined.
Since the Act itself did not present a clear statement of the meaning of
"employee," it devolved upon the courts and the National Labor Relations Board
to furnish a meaning by judicial interpretation. Unfortunately, this vacuum
led more to judicial and administrative legislation rather than interpretation.
The current controversy concerning the status of supervisory employees under the National Labor Relations Act stems primarily from the contention that
such employees are so identified with employer-interest that they are, per se, disqualified as "employees" within the meaning of the Act.
The first discoverable litigation under the Act which concerned the status
of supervisory employees and their rights thereunder was the case of Atlantic,
Greyhound Corp.6 In that case, without pursuing to any great length the question of whether the identity of interest between an employer and his supervisory
personnel disqualified the latter under the Act, the Board categorically held that
one whose supervisory or managerial functions were of a minor nature was an
"employee" within the meaning of the Act. This case, however, involved individual rather than group rights. The essence of this case was that, as individuals,
lesser supervisory employees were "employees" under the Act and, as such entitled to all of the rights and protection afforded by the Act. 7 The case neither
involved nor decided the broader issue of whether supervisory employees genSAct of July 5th, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449-457, 29 U. S. Code, Secs. 151-166.
Section 2 (3).
5
Italics supplied.
67 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1938).
?See: N.L.R.B. vs. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111; Eagle-Picher Mining Co. vs. N.L.R.B.,
119 F. (2nd) 903; N.L.R.B. vs. Skinner & Kennedy Co., 113 F. (2nd) 667; N.L.R.B. vs.
Star Pub. Co. 97 F. (2nd) 465; N.L.R.B. vs. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. (2nd)
488; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. vs. N.L.R.B., 127 F. (2nd) 109.
4
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erally and as a class came within the category of "employees" under the Act.
Thus this question, together with the resultant issue of whether such a class was
entitled to collective (as contrasted to individual) bargaining rights under the
Act remained unanswered.
Following the Atlantic Greyhound Corp. case there ensued a period in which
the Board vacillated indecisively on the question of basic right, never explicitly
ruling on the question but vicariously concerned itself with the secondary aspects of the issue. During this period the Board, by indirection, first suggested'
that supervisory employees were entitled to the right of collective bargaining
under the Act by holding that a unit consisting of assistant foremen, weighmasters and other kindred managerial functionaries of a colliery constituted an
appropriate bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes under the Act.
Although the fundamental question of supervisory personnel as "employees"
and their right to collective bargaining were not directly determined, these elements were circuitously affirmed by the Board's decision that such employees
formed an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In the same year, 1942, the question of propriety of bargaining unit was
again before the Board. This time, however, the proposed bargaining unit consisted not only of all non-working foremen (exclusive, however, of general foremen), but of production workers as well. Notwithstanding the joinder of supervisory and production workers in the proposed bargaining unit, the majority
of the Board held9 that the unit was a proper one for collective bargaining purposes. Board member Gerard D. Reilly, however, dissented from the majority
view, urging that formation of the bargaining unit was improper in that supervisory and production employees were joined in a single bargaining unit. The
dissenting member of the Board protested that such an indiscriminate co-mixture
of personnel in a single bargaining unit would place the supervisory employees
in an extraordinary position to interfere with the rights guaranteed by the Act
to the other employees.
It will be noted that in the Godchaux case, as in the preceding Union Coheries Coal Co. case, the emphasis was on the propriety of the composition of
the proposed bargaining unit, rather than upon the cardinal and underlying
question of the status of supervisory employees and their basic rights as such.
Whatever treatment these considerations received was indirect and casual.
Strangely enough, in a case10 that was decided after, the Godchaux case,
but within the same month, the Board, upon substantially comparable facts,
rendered a decision which was founded upon the minority dissent rather than
the majority opinion in the Godchaux case. Almost immediately following, the
8
Matter
9

of Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 874.
Matter of Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (No. 172).

IOMatter of the Stanley Co., etc., 45 N.L.R.B. 625

(No. 94).
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Board, in a decision11 that completely confused the issue, held that a bargaining
unit which was comprised exclusively of general foremen, foremen and assistant
foremen and contained no non-supervisory employees, was an inappropriate bargaining unit. This decision was reached on the grounds that since the general
foremen had supervisory authority over the foremen and the latter exercised
similar authority over assistant foremen, the consolidation of these classes of
employees in a single bargaining unit placed each group, in turn, in a position
to stultify the lesser group's rights under the Act. Despite the incongruity of
this decision, it did, however, reaffirm the implication in previous cases that
supervisory employees were "employees" under the provisions of the Act and
consequently were entitled to the right of collective bargaining conferred by the
Act upon "employees."
On May 11th, 1943, the Board, in exercise of its juridical prerogatives,
underwent a complete and thorough change of heart. It peremptorily decided 12
that although supervisory personnel were "employees" within the meaning of
the Act, they were not entitled to the right of collective bargaining secured by
the Act. In this case, for the first time, the Board dealt directly and squarely
with the issued concealed under the cloaking question of propriety of bargainingunits. The reasons with which the Board fortified its startling decision was
one which had by that time become trite: i. e., the inclusion of supervisory and
production employees in a single bargaining unit endangered the rights of the
production employees. The second reason was more original. It was elicited
by the proposal in the Petition for Investigation that alternative and separate
bargaining units be composed exclusively of supervisors of the grade of "temporary supervisors" and "working leaders." This proposal produced the unexpected decision that "We are of the opinion that in the present state of industrial
administration and employee self-organization, the establishment of bargaining
units composed of supervisors exercising substantial managerial authority will
impede the processes of collective bargaining, disrupt established managerial
and production techniques and militate against effectuation of the policies of
the Act." The Board thereupon unembarassedly stated that it was reversing
its prior decisions in the Union Collieries Coal Co. and Godchaux Sugar cases.
While the Board's courage and candor merit recognition and commendation, the validity of its obverse conclusions is a matter of serious debate. Since
the Act itself expressly secures the right of collective bargaining to "employees,"
an immediate need for explanation was created by the Board's anamolous decision that even though supervisory personnel were "employees" within the
provisions of the Act, they were nevertheless disentitled to the privileges guaranteed to "employees" by the Act because of the exigencies of modern industrial
methods. Board Member, Chairman Harry A. Millis, furnished the explanation
llMatter
of Boeing Aircraft Company, 45 N.L.R.B. 630 (No. 95).
12
Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (No. 105).
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in his dissenting opinion in which he concluded that the majority Board, in
rendering its decision, had cast itself in the role of administrative legislators.
"Manifestly," Chairman Millis asserted, "to engraft upon the Act an amendment"3 which denies to a substantial segment of employees, as a class, the protection vouchsafed therein to all 'employees' 14 is not within the permissable
bounds of administrative discretion, but is administrative legislation."
In searching for a further explanation for this surprising reversal of policy
by the Board, it is interesting to note, as Allen, C. J., of the U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 15 observed, that this decision coincided with the pendency in Congress of a bill which proposed to make the Act inapplicable to
foremen. Whether because of the Board's decision or in spite of it, the Act
did not succeed in passing.
Whatever the merit or legal validity of the Board's position in the Maryland Drydock case, it must be conceded that the decision at least clarified the
issue. Although continued for several succeeding cases16 this condition of clarity, however, did not long survive, for on May 8th, 1944, in the case of Soss
Manufacturing Co. 1 7 the process of obfuscation was again resumed. In tht
latter case, one in which a foreman was alleged to have been discriminatorily
discharged because of his admitted activities in the Foremen's Association of
America, 8 the respondent-employer was ordered to reinstate the foreman in accordance with the terms of the Act. The Board, on the basis of its position that
supervisory personnel were "employees" held that such "employees" were entitled to the Act's guarantee against discriminatory discharge for union activity,
even though, under the Maryland Drydock case, neither the supervisory employees
(nor the very labor organizations in which, the Board acknowledged, their activities were protected by the Act) were entitled to engage in collective bargaining. In ordering the reinstatement of the particular foreman, the Board, in effect, held that supervisory personnel were "employees" for one purpose of the
Act (security against discriminatory discharge), but not for another purpose (collective bargaining). Nor did the Board do much to disperse the recurrent fog
by noting in its opinion that, "In reaching this conclusion we do not mean to
suggest, of course, that every discharge of a supervisory employee for union activity is a violation of the Act."
On March 26th, 1945 the Board, in the case of the Packard Motor Car Co., 9
achieved a monumental masterpiece of administrative acrobatics. It executed
13Italics Supplied.
14This remark was made by Chairman Millis after he noted that the majority Board members had
acknowledged that supervisory personnel were "employees."
151n the case of N.L.R.B. vs. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F. (2nd) 80.
6
1 Matter of Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 66; Matter of Murray Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 94;
Matter of General Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457.
1756 N.L.R.B. 348 (No. 70).
18A national labor union comprised entirely of supervisory employees.
1961 N.L.R.B. 4 (No. 3).
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an aerial reversal without leaving the ground. Or at least it protested that it
had its feet on the ground. In an amazing decision, it concluded that the same
modern industrial conditions which, in the Maryland Drydock case, it held to
preclude organization and collective bargaining by supervisory personnel as a
group it now (approximately 22 months later) declaimed it imperative that
such personnel be permitted to organize their own groups and engage in collective bargaining. Moreover, with supreme decision, it decreed that not only
were supervisory employees entitled to organize and bargain collectively but that
they formed an appropriate bargaining unit, notwithstanding that the supervisory
employees forming the particular bargaining unit may hold supervisory authority over other members of the unit. This was a complete reversal of all that it
had previously held on the subject. Having established that it had the fortitude
to interpret the law as it finally saw it, even at the expense of denunciation for
inconsistancy, the Board, in the very same opinion, suffered a weakening of its
resolution by declaring that its act in declaring a bargaining unit consisting of
all levels of foremen to constitute a proper bargaining unit was merely an experimental ruling; that it reserved the right to reconsider its ruling in event that
it should not prove feasible in practise. The Board thereupon ordered an election which eventuated in the election of the Foremen's Association as the unit's bargaining representative, following which it was certified as such by the Board.
This development, unfortunately, did not end the matter for the employer-corporation refused, despite the election, to recognize the union or to bargain collectively with it. The union countered by filing with the Board a charge of unfair labor practise because of the Packard Motor Car Company's defiant refusal
20
to comply with the Act. A complaint was issued by the Board. The case culminated in a Cease and Desist Order directing the Company to bargain collectively with the union. When the Company persisted in its refusal to comply with
the order, the Board filed with the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) a petition for enforcement. That Court, in a decision handed down by
Allen, C. J.,1' sustained the Board on all counts. The Court, taking cognizance
that the acts of supervisory employees, as against other workers, operated to bind
the employer, nevertheless held that despite this and other industrial indicia of
identity of interest between supervisory personnel and employer, the former, insofar as their own interests were concerned were, vis-a-vis the employer, "employees" under the term of the Act and, notwithstanding the duality of their role,
were entitled to all the rights and protections which the Act afforded to other
employees. The Court, in rendering its opinion, however, made a point of noting
that this decision was predicated, in a great measure, on the fact that the claimant foremen's Association was an independent labor union which excluded socalled "rank and file workers" and was comprised entirely of supervisory workers.

20Matter of Packard Motor Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 1214 (No. 204).
21N.L.R.B. vs. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F. (2nd) 80.
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In the interim and prior to the Circuit Court's confirmation of its opinion
in the Packard Motor Car Company case the Board undertook to enlarge the

policy which it enunciated in that case. In succession it held that neither the
nature of the industry in which they are employed nor the degree of supervisory
discretion which they enjoy are determinants of the rights of supervisory employees, that their rights under the Act obtain notwithstanding such considerations22 ; and, more important, that supervisory bargaining units and "rank
and
2
file" bargaining units may be affiliated with a single parent labor union.
These latter decisions seemed to indicate that the Board had finally decided
to remove all qualifications from its determination that supervisory employees
were entitled to the full privileges and protections of the Act. But, not unexpectedly, once again the Board interjected an old distinction into what was
apparently a completely decided issue of law. On February 12th, 1946, in the
case of Midland Steel Products Co. 21 it displayed a revitalized interest in the
contention that a hierarchal difference existed between different levels of supervisory employees according to the degree of their respective supervisory discretion and authority. Accordingly, in that case, the Board decided to order separate elections between the several grades of supervisors. In its accustomed unorthodox fashion (despite the fact that, even conceding that only an issue of
propriety of the composition of bargaining units was involved, and it was its
undelegable duty to determine the proper unit2") it held that it would be bound
by the decision of the employees as evidenced by the result of the election. In
other words, it delegated the decision of this important question to the voting
employees.
Of course it would be mere conjecture to venture an opinion as to the course
which the Board would have pursued had not the Supreme Court recently intervened to sustain the Board's decision in the Packard Motor Car case. Whether
or not such a development would have occurred without the crystallization of the
law by the Supreme Court is anyone's guess, but, on the basis of the history of
the Board's treatment of the issue it is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that the Board, in another attack of unpredictability, might have subverted
the entire state of the law by again reversing itself. However, such a disconcerting contingency has been precluded by the Supreme Court which, in a five
to four decision written by Mr. Justice Jackson 26 (and dissented from by Mr.
Justice Douglass, Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Burton concurring in the
dissent in full, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in the dissent in part) held
that not only are supervisory personnel "employees" within the meaning of the
22

Matter of Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. - (No. 59).
2SMatter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. - (No. 51)
ceived final judicial approval.
2465 N.L.R.B. - (No. 177).
25N.L.R.B. vs. Marshall Field & Co., 135 F. (2nd) 391.
2667 S. Ct. 789 (March 10th, 1947).

This rule has not yet re-
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Act and as such entitled to all the benefits of the Act, but that employers are
bound by the Act to bargain collecively with the bargaining agents of such employees.
While this decision of the Supreme Court undoubtedly removed all the cobwebs and barnacles from the basic issue and to that degree forfended any further
vacillation or torturing of the point, it did, in passing, take notice of the contention that the permissive unionization of supervisory personnel might result
in a division of loyalties of supervisors and constitute a disruptive force in the
industrial machinery. However, the Court stated that this was a matter for
legislative rather than judicial decision; that if the policy of the law, as it was
interpreted, was asocial then it devolved upon Congress and not the Courts (and,
presumably, nor the Board) to change the law.
Whether for better or worse, it appears that Congress has at the time of
this writing accepted the challenge. In the House of Representatives a bill which,
inter alia, bears directly on the point, has been passed and sent to Senate. The
so-called "Hartley Bill" 2 7 , in amending and amplifying the Act as it now exists,
expressly provides in Section 2 (3): "The term 'employee' . . . . shall not include
any individual employed as a supervisor . . ." If this section of the Hartley Act
or kindred provisions in the other bills now pending in Senate should be enacted
into law, the effect of such legislation would be questionable. Assuming the
constitutionality of such a statutory provision, there can be little doubt that supervisory employees would be disqualified from relief under the Act and its amendments. This disqualification, however, may not prove to be as effective a nostrum as hoped. The first difficulty will arise in determining who is a "supervisor"
and who is a "worker." In the higher managerial and lower production sections
of personnel there will be no difficulty of identification. However, in the complex organization of modern mass production systems many "twilight areas" of
classification exist. Nomanclature alone will not supply an answer, for, as stated
by Mr. Justice Douglass in his dissenting opinion in the Packard Motor Car case,
the "label" is unimportant ... for "those who are so-called foremen may perform
duties not substantially different from those of skilled workers."
Obviously
neither the Courts nor Congress can undertake to define what constitutes a "supervisor" for no matter how painstaking or circumspect the definition, it cannot escape stultification by the diversities and complexities of modern industrial organization. Neither the presence nor absence of the duty of manual work, considerations of rate of pay, title, right of discipline or kindred elements will be
decisive in every case. What may in a large plant constitute one a "supervisor,'
may, in a smaller establishment, be the ordinary characteristics of a "worker,"
or vice versa. It is conceivable that the expedient of barring from relief all
whom the unreliable term "supervisor" fits may be more productive of industrial
27H.R. 3020, 80th Congress, 1st Session (Report

Hartley of New Jersey.

No. 245), introduced by Congressman Fred
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confusion and litigation than now exists by admitting all to relief. Like Cinderella's slipper many feet must first be tried before it will be discovered who the
term fits. It is equally conceivable that every attempted application of the term
will entail protracted litigation. If such a condition ensues, it is not probable
that Congressman Hartley's proposal will produce the desired solution to the
"foreman's" problem.
Another foreseeable difficulty with the proposed congressional treatment
of this problem is that whether or not "supervisors" are disqualified from relief
under the Act and its anticipated amendments, the fact will remain that they
are "employees" by common law and common sense, a fact affirmed by Mr.
Justice Jackson in the majority opinion in the Packard Motor Car case. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Jackson stated in that opinion, as employees and entirely
apart from the provisions of the Act, they are entitled to organize into groups
for mutual self-help and for collective bargaining purposes. The only assistance
which the Act affords them is achieved by the imposition upon the employer of
the duty of recognition and collective bargaining, supplemented by a prohibition
against employer-interference or discrimination. While it is true that by removing "supervisors" from the operation of the Act there is denied to them administrative and judicial enforcement of their basic rights of organization and collective bargaining, this statutory deprivation of governmental enforcement will
not operate to impair the fundamental rights themselves. Having these rights
by law but being denied governmental aid in their enforcement, it is very likely
that in the future, even as Mr. Justice Jackson has observed was done in the past
before the promulgation of the Act, such employees will resort to their own devices to achieve the fulfillment of their legal rights. If such an eventuality should
materialize, it is hardly to be expected that less damage to industrial organization
or production will result from enforced substitution of industrial strife for the
orderly processes of law. This very prospect should suffice to indicate that whatever may be the solution it would seem that it does not lie in the direction proposed by Congressman Hartley. If, indeed, the situation does require some solu29
of full employees' rights
tion and if neither the enjoyment 28 nor the denial
will furnish the answer, then, in truth, foremen are the industrial question mark.
May 5, 1947.

2SAs prescribed by the Supreme Court.
29As indicated by the "Hartley" Bill.

